Constellan

In the 21st century the common person has intuited so thoroughly the innate history of human power-structures that she tends often to take the same for granted. Although monarchy constitutes the basis of all human civilization, as much in the ancient as also in the modern worlds, any critic tempts himself anyhow to counterweigh such truth with the plethora of human diversity, that is, to quibble over the differences between European kings and Polynesian chiefs. On the whole, however, such differences are neither substantive nor important. Generally the common person shall discover in her own research that the most basic, most important, most self-evident thread which connects the king and the chief consists not quite in the development of power-structures, nor cultural-linguistic borders – as we like these days to believe – but consists rather more in the human, intensive, immanent desire to enjoy known expectations, practicable equity, and exceptional-extraordinary relief. Although a king may hold royal courts and may issue judiciable writs, his labor is very identical with the meeting-houses and the conch-calling of a chief. Both of them fulfill those duties for like reasons in like circumstances.

Monarch is surely a convenient word of the European-descendent languages, yet the innate phenomena which this word implies are sooner universal than convenient. The collective many demand an accountable and individual one, in whom the many want to vest these expectations, this equity, this relief—and, crucially, the many do not vest the same in a council of a few, nor in a cabal of captains or diplomats. That a singular agent can dispense such things at all permits them her exigency-for-action as much as her incentive-for-benefeasance. The many secure most urgently what they demand of the one, and if the one should neglect or omit their demands, they shall know swiftly to remove this one for another. Priestess, chief, pope, mayor, speaker, chairwoman, alderman, president: these and all such styles insinuate for the common person that natural life makes a dictator [bzw. Führer] inevitable, inescapable, implicitly necessary for human endeavors; it is a story as old as human civilization. Accordingly a good government defines itself in part through the capacity of a monarch to effect known expectations, practicable equity, and exceptional-extraordinary relief. Where a monarch does not exist in material fact, or where a monarch enjoys any prerogative outside these bounds – perhaps those of judges, ministers, or delegates – a government consumes itself thus through internal corruption and moral bankruptcy. In so many words, a good monarchy signifies a good government, as long as such monarchy confines itself to rightfully monarchical concerns [Anliegen; Bedenken].

We must understand that a power-structure alone does not assure a government any success. The richest, the longest-living, the happiest nations comprise those which navigate the balance between the right power and the right duty [Macht u. Pflicht]. However, that is not identical with the other balance between a mighty power and a mighty constraint.

Because all governments exist through the will of their governed, whether their citizens or their slaves, the governments of nations must render them the right services for the right costs—not negate the wrong services at the wrong times. False negatives are more dangerous than false affirmatives. A constitutionally granted prerogative must be counterweighed not by some additional prerogative, but instead by the intrinsic constraint of a directed focus. A dictator enjoys no cause to abuse his position, if at the same time he must ignore the temptations that could negate or omit the reasons of that very position. Reasonable actors do not choose their self-defeat in the game of natural life. It is thus ever wiser to let a dictator run amok inside an extrinsically limited boundary, so that the power-structure incents him rather to cooperate willingly with other governmental agents. Indeed, if instead a dictator cannot run amok because he suffers the perpetual infighting of his peers, he shall find and instigate his powers then in other, illegitimate means. The less a person can do legitimately, however distasteful, the more a person can do illegitimately. The more a monarch surrenders her monarchical concerns, the less significance she or her position enjoys. When she loses the focus of her position, she induces her own demise as much as her government’s demise. Good decisions do not originate in the careful planning of jealous bureaucrats, but originate rather fluidly out of the intuitive, innate desire for known expectations, practicable equity, and exceptional-extraordinary relief. Whereas that is the domain of the monarch, so any monarchy must be carefully appointed, advised, and accounted.

The right power-structure makes no effective difference when the wrong person has been appointed at the wrong time, or when he endures ill advice or worse accountability. On the other hand, if a monarchy is structured rightfully, its imposing duties shall induce the naturally right monarch of a government, who shall assure its nation some good and perpetual success.

A good government operates itself through the prominence of its duties, while ill governments operate themselves through that of their powers. No constraint is mightier than a power, yet by the same coin, every power is subordinate to a duty. Whereas human civilization tends to be identical across disparate cultures, so such living pyramid of power impels the human instinct towards the demand for a monarch. It is that phenomenon which necessitates a monarch; it punishes those also implicitly who lose sight of their monarchical concerns. The singular path for good, perpetual success consists of a monarch who enjoys the right duties with the right powers, so that merely incidentally the right person is appointed at the right time by those whom the monarch governs after the fact. For the better, and also for the worse, a monarch and a nation reflect themselves in many scales and perspectives, even when a monarch were abstractly societal than concretely personal, i.e., when a monarch were so ideological as to lose touch with material history—and perhaps the more so in such cases.

What is the right duty-structure of a monarchy, then? Such answer begins truly, essentially the definition of a good government.

Constellary Duties in Brief

The word constellan is new; its history shall begin ever from Silofais. It is a ‘portmanteau’ of the Latin-descendent words constable and castellan, which dissolve themselves further into: ‘with the stables’ and ‘for the castle.’ [Das ist eine ‚Wortverschmelzung‘ von Wachtmeister und Burgvogt.] Although it is true, that the 2025 presidents of Argentina, South Korea, and other nations do govern larger, more complex administrations than could their precursors have imagined a generation ago, nevertheless their positions and bureaus – hence, their decisional means over monarchical concerns – owe themselves to the people’s needs for self-actualization, economic security, and statal taxes. Once these needs have appeared like the Latin forts of the City of London. Other times they have appeared like die Burgen of Germania, te tino rangatiratanga of Māori, or fornnordiska allemansrätten of Scandinavia. The stables and castles look differently, but their societal purposes have remained the same. Someone is so needed, as to create the conditions at all for the church—whether near the pews or in another continent.

Forever a monarch must be accountable and ready, because forever the society wants an inspirational servant-leader who reconciles the infrastructure and the state, so that the church can exist whatsoever. It is not material whether that church be centralized, dispersed or elsewise, because every church takes on new forms over enough time. The important critical object does not consist with the powers, ranks, hierarchies among the decisionmakers. It is the delimitation of those boundaries, which distinguish the duties of the monarchy to strategize a certain, willful, active common [Allmende]. It is the consensus among unique persons, or is their willingness to trade together, rather than the state per se that collects their fiscal tithings. The human essence, that shares human resources with some, yet not with others; that, that chooses the borders of the in- and the outgroups, it begets the monarch. It is phenomenally the monarch’s master, so the monarch must have precisely those powers post factum, which enable the reasonable and due actions of the political intentions. Whenever acts cannot match wills, or vice versa, the dictator seeks thereby illegitimate means in order to placate the public consensus which would mutiny otherwise. The most fundamental duty of the Constellan, therefore, consists to manage a national-diplomatic strategy [the expectations]; to align equal opportunities and free merits [the equity]; and to marshal the Silofaisan game among material history [aufstellen], in order to epitomize good servant-leadership for actual, potential crises [the relief]. Concisely, the Constellan shall govern the statal goals, so that merely incidentally the church should earn, maintain its historical autonomy.

These words are deliberate, insofar as they describe the earlier 2025 presidents as if they would lack finally the overwhelming hegemony of the executive ministries. The Silofaisan Constellan is unique for many reasons, but the most prominent is the official separation of the Cabinet. The two branches keep a relationship, of course, but they instigate themselves constantly because they cannot compel the other except through sincere cooperation. The Constellan governs the national strategy, yet not the tactics; and, for example, commands the use of statal arms, but cannot decide certain questions of rules, resources, or regulations. Speaking generally, the Constellan has a peculiar perquisite that permits a relatively firmer, denser absolute management of the bureau facilitating the official duties. In the counterbalance, though, the Constellan has no immediate powers, no such ways to transform the dutiful means into powerful goals. The officer receives a cleaner will between the person and the society, but suffers an imprisoned act for that will, because each act materializes itself only by the decisions of those, whomever the Constellan will have appointed in advance.

An example helps here. This officer is the supreme commander of the uniformed service, and the bureau will concern itself enormously in the administration of that service; but, because the Constellan cannot make the real decisions in a battlefield, in the promotions of personnel, etc., so the supreme command thereof depends totally on the trust which the Constellan sets actually down between the office and – in this case – the highest-echelon leaders of the uniformed service. The example depicts another face of the Silofaisan dual-constraint. Hence, the most powerful individual in Silofais, who empowers the greatest common, is already essentially constrained through some official scarce resources of human civilization, e.g., through time and trust. Despite that the constellary goals want to strategize, equalize, and relieve, the constellary means exist not much farther beyond written declarations, promulgated policies, and carefully appointed advisors/leaders. Although the Constitution may grant the Constellan several duties and powers, inter alia, none are so heavier that they could outweigh the implicitly looming law to surround oneself of the right, never the wrong company. As it is the difference of a happy and a dead captain-general, so it is the same between a happy Silofais and an angry, covetous uproot. The Constellan of Silofais shall be ultimately a steward, forever more than a prince; and shall be appointed or removed by the implied, never direct quality of the company that the officer wants to keep.

The name is the job. Silofais wants, thus rewards a studious constable in order to maintain the walls, watch the gates, provide the horses, and predict the traitors. In exchange for so much power, the monarch’s concerns consist of general scope, general scale, the due dais of the Silofaisan state. Before those powers do much greater duties arrive, so the castellan ought to enjoy – not impugn, disparage – that the ministers, the delegates, and the judges undertake other responsibilities. Instead of bureaucratic foes, actually, the Constellan ought to take them for strategic allies. The greater their ideological disagreements, the sooner their friction yields the necessary nationwide evolution. Sitting atop the castle, the Constellan shall foresee the dangers, manage a consensus, and facilitate-liaise the governmental ways for public commons-improvements (or will be else removed). As long as the officer is appointed by a method that rewards trust and time, punishes fraud and waste, inspires instead of destroys, then the Constellan becomes the sovereign hand of floral unity.

The foregoing discussion does not affirm much and is mostly descriptive; but sometimes a thing understands itself more thoroughly, more consistently, more often through its self-negation than some prescriptive ordainment. That is to say, the constellan is understood slower by a legal theory, but faster by the descriptions of the other branches (plus the pillars). What they are not, the constellan is, and vice versa. The hand wants the chain, but Silofaisan unity needs a sovereign flower. Their confluent compromise consists in those forests of the Constellary Seal, along which paths the delegates account, the ministers appoint, the judges advise, and the sea-captain navigates them all by a sturdy ship through the tumultuous games of human civilization. May the crew know themselves, choose well, and listen better. May the church rule, the state reign, their constitution lead a more profitable voyage than could the quartermaster have rendered without the captain—or the captain without the crew.